Adversarial Examples etc.

G. Tredan
CyberIA/ Sibír' - 2025



Hi

Me

- CNRS researcher at LAAS (Toulouse,FR) since 2011. `gtredan@laas.fr`
- Disclaimer: researcher, not lecturer
- Disclaimer: Huge topic



This talk

- Originally prepared in 23, Updated for Siberia
- Thank you Birhanu Eshete. Check `https://trustworthy-ml-course.github.io/`
- Flight Plan:
  1. Disambiguation and common misunderstandings
  2. General definition and how to find them
  3. Examples and use-cases
  4. Hands-on by Philippe
  5. Why we like adversarial examples

Generative Adversarial Network $\neq$ Adversarial Example



- 432 500 dollars chez Christie's le 25 octobre 2018.
- Même si l'algorithme crée l'image [. . .], ceux qui ont décidé d'imprimer sur de la toile, de la signer d'une formule mathématique, de mettre un cadre en or, c'est nous

Goodfellow et al. (2014). Generative Adversarial Nets (NIPS 2014)

A historical perspective

- Before LLMs, Classifiers were

  The hot thing
- **ICLR 2014**: "Adversarial examples are inputs crafted by making slight perturbations to legitimate inputs with the intent of misleading machine learning model"
  - Szegedy et al.. Intriguing properties of neural networks
- Think **worst case**, not average case.
- **2016:** CleverHans: software library that provides standardized reference implementations
  - `https://github.com/cleverhans-lab/cleverhans`

Are models right for the wrong reasons ?

- A labelled example (x, y_{true})
- A function family $\{h_\theta, \theta \in \mathbb{R}^s\}$
- A loss function $J(\theta, x, y_{true})$
- ERM:
  $\hat{h} = \min_\theta \mathbb{E}_{x,y \in Train}(J(\theta, x, y) \quad (+\lambda\Omega(\theta))$
- Solution: Gradient descent -Cauchy,1847
  $\theta_t = \theta_{t-1} - \gamma\Delta_\theta(J)$



Gradient Descent with Two Parameters

The Idea

What if we differentiate according to x ?

- A labelled example (x, y_{true})
- A function family $\{h_\theta, \theta \in \mathbb{R}^s\}$
- A loss function $J(\theta, x, y_{true})$
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

Gradient Descent with Two Parameters

The Idea

What if we differentiate according to x ?

$$adv_x = x + \epsilon \cdot sign(\Delta_x J(\theta, x, y))$$



Yes we can: Automatic Differentiation!





It works VEEERY well

$$adv_x = x + \epsilon \cdot sign(\Delta_x J(\theta, x, y))$$



Goodfellow, Shlens,Szegedy. "Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples" ICLR 2015.


Decision Tree
SVM (Gaussian kernel)
Neural Network
Random Forest


Decision Tree
SVM #1 (much generalized)
SVM #2 (much overfitted)
SVM #3 (moderate)
Neural Network
Random Forest



Loss Landscape for deep learning (Li et al. ,2018)

https://www.cs.umd.edu/ tomg/projects/landscapes/

Why do we care ? A/ The threat

Digital automated decisions increasingly have IRL consequences..

(a) Input 1 (b) Input 2 (darker version of 1)

Figure 1: An example erroneous behavior found by DeepXplore in Nvidia DAVE-2 self-driving car platform. The DNN-based self-driving car correctly decides to turn left for image (a) but incorrectly decides to turn right and crashes into the guardrail for image (b), a slightly darker version of (a).

DeepXplore: Automated Whitebox Testing of Deep Learning Systems, Kexin Pei et al. SOSP'17
`https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.06640`

Distance/Angle	Subtle Poster	Subtle Poster Right Turn	Camouflage Graffiti	Camouflage Art (LISA-CNN)	Camouflage Art (GTSRB-CNN)
5′ 0°					
5′ 15°					
10′ 0°					
10′ 30°					
40′ 0°					
Targeted-Attack Success	100%	73.33%	66.67%	100%	80%

Robust Physical-World Attacks on Deep Learning Visual Classification Dawn Song , CVPR 2018

(a) (b) (c) (d)

Figure 4: Examples of successful impersonation and dodging attacks. Fig. (a) shows S_A (top) and S_B (bottom) dodging

Accessorize to a Crime: Real and Stealthy Attacks on State-of-the-Art Face Recognition

Mahmood Sharif et al. CCS'2016

Adversarial Perturbations Against Deep Neural Networks for Malware Classification

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ESORICS'17



Exploring Adversarial Examples in Malware Detection

Suciu et al. S&P workshop 19

Is it even a problem ?

Is it even a problem ?

Though limitation:
attacker needs to **know** target model



But Adversarial Examples

- transfer across models
- transfer across samples
- transfer attack → build surrogate → transfer back surrogate AE
- (oh: fooled class can be targeted too)

Why do we care ? B/ The concept



		CaffeNet [8]	VGG-F [2]	VGG-16 [17]	VGG-19 [17]	GoogLeNet [18]	ResNet-152 [6]
ℓ_2	X	85.4%	85.9%	90.7%	86.9%	82.9%	89.7%
	Val.	85.6	87.0%	90.3%	84.5%	82.0%	88.5%
ℓ_∞	X	93.1%	93.8%	78.5%	77.8%	80.8%	85.4%
	Val.	93.3%	93.7%	78.3%	77.8%	78.9%	84.0%

	VGG-F	CaffeNet	GoogLeNet	VGG-16	VGG-19	ResNet-152
VGG-F	**93.7%**	71.8%	48.4%	42.1%	42.1%	47.4 %
CaffeNet	74.0%	**93.3%**	47.7%	39.9%	39.9%	48.0%
GoogLeNet	46.2%	43.8%	**78.9%**	39.2%	39.8%	45.5%
VGG-16	63.4%	55.8%	56.5%	**78.3%**	73.1%	63.4%
VGG-19	64.0%	57.2%	53.6%	73.5%	**77.8%**	58.0%
ResNet-152	46.3%	46.3%	50.5%	47.0%	45.5%	**84.0%**



Universal adversarial perturbations; Pascal Frossard et al. CVPR 2017

Why do we care ? B/ The concept



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

Figure 9: Singular values of matrix N containing normal vectors to the decision decision boundary.



Figure 10: Illustration of the low dimensional subspace $\mathcal{S}$ containing normal vectors to the decision boundary in regions surrounding natural images. For the purpose of this illustration, we super-impose three data-points $\{x_i\}_{i=1}^3$, and the adversarial perturbations $\{r_i\}_{i=1}^3$ that send the re-

Universal adversarial perturbations; Pascal Frossard et al. CVPR 2017



Figure 1. Evaluating the smoothed classifier at an input x. **Left**: the decision regions of the base classifier f are drawn in different colors. The dotted lines are the level sets of the distribution $\mathcal{N}(x, \sigma^2 I)$. **Right**: the distribution $f(\mathcal{N}(x, \sigma^2 I))$. As discussed below, $\underline{p_A}$ is a lower bound on the probability of the top class and $\overline{p_B}$ is an upper bound on the probability of each other class. Here, $g(x)$ is "blue."



(a) No RS (b) $n = 10, \sigma = 0.05$

(c) $n = 50, \sigma = 0.05$ (d) $n = 200, \sigma = 0.05$



Certified Adversarial Robustness via Randomized Smoothing, Cohen Rosenfeld Kolter, ICML 2019

Maho, Furon, Le Merrer, Randomized Smoothing Under Attack: How Good is it in Practice?. In ICASSP 2022



Adversarial vulnerability for any classifier

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A Universal Law of Robustness via Isoperimetry

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Abstract

Classically, data interpolation with a parametrized model class is possible as long as the number of parameters is larger than the number of equations to be satisfied. A puzzling phenomenon in deep learning is that models are trained with many more parameters than what this classical theory would suggest. We propose a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon. We prove that for a broad class of data distributions and model classes, overparametrization is *necessary* if one wants to interpolate the data *smoothly*. Namely we show that *smooth* interpolation requires d times more parameters than mere interpolation, where d is the ambient data dimension. We prove this universal law of robustness for any smoothly parametrized function class with polynomial size weights, and any covariate distribution verifying isoperimetry (or a mixture thereof). In the case of two-layer neural networks and Gaussian covariates, this law was conjectured in prior work by Bubeck, Li and Nagaraj. We also give an interpretation of our result as an improved generalization bound for model classes consisting of smooth functions.



Bubeck, S., Li, Y., Nagaraj, D. M. (2021, July). A law of robustness for two-layers neural networks. In Conference on Learning Theory (pp. 804-820). PMLR.



In hard-label setups, a label change is the only observable.
NB: WB/BB $\rightarrow$ Open/closed garden.

Our use of AE



(a)



(b)



(c)



(d)



Le Merrer, Perez, Tredan. Adversarial frontier stitching for remote neural network watermarking. Neural Computing and Applications,2020

Le Merrer, Tredan. Tampernn: efficient tampering detection of deployed neural nets. ISSRE 2019

Work in progress...





Adversarial Examples for LLMs

'Positive review only': Researchers hide AI prompts in papers

Instructions in preprints from 14 universities highlight controversy on AI in peer review



Highlighting a seemingly blank space in a preprint on arXiv reveals an AI prompt. (Photo by Kaori Yuzawa)

SHOGO SUGIYAMA and RYOSUKE EGUCHI
July 1, 2025 01:21 JST

B'casso
@_lifeonthemoon

1. Copy the WHOLE job description. Paste it at the end of your resume.

2. Change the letters to white so they blend w/ the page

3. Save as pdf so they can't go in and see what you did

Now your name is lighting up on the recruiter's list cuz your resume got all the key words

> **pauly! pauli! paulé!** @Thmpsn
> Y'all got any tips on applying for jobs?

7/31/18, 11:00 PM

Adversarial Examples for LLMs



Figure 1: A brief illustration of the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) algorithm (Zou et al., 2023).

..as illustrated by Zhao et al.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.01251

Difficulties

- Token space = discrete space
- Perceivability ?
- Assessing $J(\hat{y}, y_{true})$ may not be easy
- Yet all classification results *should* apply in some contexts (0/few shot learning)

Opportunities ?

- Really hot topic
- Too hot ?

"Real Attackers Don't Compute Gradients": Bridging the Gap Between Adversarial ML Research and Practice

Giovanni Apruzzese*, Hyrum S. Anderson§, Savino Dambra¶, David Freeman†, Fabio Pierazzi‖, Kevin Roundy¶
*University of Liechtenstein, §Robust Intelligence, ¶Norton Research Group, †Meta, ‖King's College London

TABLE III: List of original OBSERVATIONS made in our paper.

#	OBSERVATION	Ref.
1	ML models are only one component of ML systems.	§II-A
2	Academia and industry perceive adversarial ML differently.	§II-B
3	Economics is the main driver of practical cybersecurity.	§II-C
4	Evasion is achieved by bypassing all layers of an ML system.	§III-A
5	Evidence of adversarial examples in the wild is scarce.	§III-B
6	Queries are not always an effective measure of attack cost.	§III-C
7	Attackers use domain expertise and have broad goals.	§IV-B
8	Defenses can envision either strong or weak attackers.	§IV-C
9	Terminology is often imprecise and/or inconsistent.	§IV-D
10	Evading some ML systems can be very simple.	App.A-D

Conclusion

"Imperceptible alterations introduced by an adversary in a ML system input to change its result"

- AE have now 11 years
- *Worst case low intensity perturbation*
- Sparkled intense research in
  - Attacks methods
  - Defenses strategies
  - Explanations
- Revealed our lack of understanding!
- Actual security threat ? Humm..
- Many applications nevertheless
- Inaugurated Adversarial ML